Ukraine deal: Europe has learned from the failed 2015 Minsk accords with Putin. Trump has not

The Russian president, Vladimir Putin, has agreed to pause attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure for 30 days following a phone call with his American counterpart, Donald Trump. On social media, Trump said the call was “very good and productive” and came “with an understanding that we will be working quickly to have a complete ceasefire”.

This optimism is misplaced. The White House did not mention that Putin issued additional conditions for a ceasefire. The Kremlin demands that Ukraine be effectively disarmed, leaving it defenceless against a Russian takeover. Such terms would be unacceptable to Ukraine and its European partners.

At this juncture, Trump and his negotiators would do well to ponder why previous attempts to restrain Russia and secure a lasting peace for Ukraine did not succeed.

This war did not start when shells began to rain on Kyiv in February 2022. Russia had already been waging an undeclared war on its neighbour for nearly eight years in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas, where pro-Russian proxy forces have been stoking up trouble in the border regions of Luhansk and Donetsk.

Attempts to end the fighting there were made in September 2014 and February 2015, when Russia and Ukraine signed ceasefire agreements during negotiations in Minsk, Belarus.

Both sets of Minsk agreements proved to be non-starters. The fighting in the region rumbled on until it culminated in Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The accords stored problems for the future.

Minsk-1 and Minsk-2

The first Minsk protocols were signed in 2014 by Russia, Ukraine, separatists from Donbas and representatives from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The agreement provided for an immediate ceasefire monitored by the OSCE, the withdrawal of “foreign mercenaries” from Ukraine and the establishment of a demilitarised buffer zone.

But Moscow also insisted that Kyiv grant temporary “special status” to the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, the two separatist regions in Donbas. Instead of helping Ukraine regain control over its eastern territories, the agreement allowed the Russia-backed rebels to hold local elections and legalised them as a party to the conflict.

The ceasefire collapsed within days of signing. The provisions that sought to demarcate the lines of the conflict and give Ukraine back control over its eastern border were not observed by the rebels, and fighting intensified during the winter.

With the death toll rising, the leaders of France and Germany rushed to broker a fresh round of negotiations in February 2015. The resulting accords, which were known as Minsk-2, also failed to bring peace.

Russia and its proxy militants in Donbas immediately and repeatedly violated its terms. Astonishingly, Minsk-2 did not even mention Russia, despite it signing the protocols. Moscow continued to deny its involvement in eastern Ukraine, while stepping up armed assistance to the rebels.

Kyiv was saddled with peace terms that were impossible to implement unless Ukraine was prepared to throw away its sovereignty. Minsk-2 stipulated that the “special status” of the eastern separatist regions was to become permanent, and that the Ukrainian constitution was to be amended to allow for “decentralisation” of power from Kyiv to the rebel regions.

These regions were to be granted autonomy in financial matters, responsibility for their stretch of the border with Russia, and the right to conclude foreign agreements and hold referenda. To undercut Ukrainian independence further, a neutrality clause inserted into its constitution would effectively bar the country’s entry into Nato.

Understandably, no one in Kyiv rushed to implement these self-destructive terms. In an interview with German magazine Der Spiegel in 2023, Volodymyr Zelensky said that when he became Ukraine’s president in 2019 and examined Minsk-2, he “did not recognise any desire in the agreements to allow Ukraine its independence”.

Zelensky’s comment points to the fundamental flaw of the Minsk-2 agreement. Its western brokers failed to recognise that Russian war aims were irreconcilable with Ukrainian sovereignty. Moscow’s objective from the start was to use Donbas to destabilise the government in Kyiv and gain control over Ukraine.

Western peacemakers searched for a compromise, but the Kremlin used Minsk-2 to advance its goals. As Duncan Allan of the Chatham House research institute noted in 2020: “Russia sees the Minsk agreements as tools with which to break Ukraine’s sovereignty.” The war in Donbas raged on and, by 2020, had claimed 14,000 lives, with 1.5 million people becoming refugees.

Germany’s ex-chancellor, Angela Merkel, a key broker, subsequently defended the Minsk agreements. She said they bought Kyiv time to arm itself against Russia. It was a costly purchase. Minsk-2 froze the conflict in one locality rather than ended it. And it encouraged Russia, paving the way for a full-scale invasion.

Emphasising Ukrainian sovereignty

The existential differences between Ukraine and Russia that plagued the Minsk agreements remain today. Ukraine has demonstrated its resolve to defend its sovereignty, while Russia’s invasion in 2022 testifies to its determination to squash Ukrainian resolve. The timing of the attack so close to the seventh anniversary of Minsk-2 adds grim emphasis to that point.

This clash of objectives must be addressed head-on in any peace negotiations. The only way to secure lasting peace in Europe is to avoid rewarding the aggressor and punishing its victim.

The Kremlin has already openly declared that it sees Trump-led brokerage as the west’s acknowledgement of Russian strategic superiority. It needs to be disabused of this notion. As argued by Nataliya Bugayova, a fellow at the Institute for the Study of War, the war is not lost yet. Russia is far from invulnerable, and it can be made to accept defeat.

But for any agreement to be effective, there can be no ambiguity or middle ground on the subject of Ukrainian sovereignty. It must be protected and backed by security guarantees.

So far, the Trump administration has shown little understanding of this. But ten years down the line from Minsk-2, Europeans have finally grasped it.

Finland’s president, Aleksander Stubbs, told reporters on March 19 that Ukraine must “absolutely” not lose sovereignty and territory. And, on the day Trump and Putin had their discussion, Germany’s parliament voted for a massive boost in defence spending – another indicator that Europeans are no longer taking Putin on trust.

This article first appeared in 'The Conversation' on 19 March 2025.